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Charities often request donations while offering of a near-worthless token, like a key 
chain, in exchange. Little research has examined whether such ‘exchange’ requests are met 
with higher compliance rates than merely asking people to donate. Our studies suggest that in 
mere donation settings people may have difficulties to estimate a socially acceptable donation 
amount and therefore prefer opportunities that provide them with an anchor price. The value 
of a material good in a donation setting can play this anchoring role and signal a reference 
price.  To the extent that the suggested reference price is low enough, exchange requests lead 
to more compliance than mere donation requests. In addition, our results indicate that, when 
accompanied by specified amounts, mere donation requests result in even better compliance 
rates than exchange requests.  
 





Economists and social psychologists have often attempted to understand charitable 
giving from the supply side of donations: “Why should people make sacrifices for others?”  
Recently, however, researchers have recognized the importance of considering also the 
demand for donations, that is, the fund-raising side of the market. Fund-raising has developed 
to a huge, sophisticated and competitive business (Andreoni, 2005). Although there is not 
much literature or data collection on fund-raising strategies, there is a great deal of ‘common’ 
knowledge about the best fund-raising practices.  For example, charities and 
nongovernmental organizations are known to bundle donation requests with an often near-
worthless exchange, like a plastic key chain, a pencil, or a set of postcards that you may 
never use.  In doing so, they present the donation request as an exchange, or an economic 
transaction. Intuition and some research (Holmes, Miller, and Lerner 2002) suggest that 
adding some return utility to a donation may make donating more attractive, even if the 
resulting utility is minimal or even illusionary.  
In this paper, we examine why consumers react positively to donation requests that 
are framed as the sale of a product. We propose that an exchange may increase compliance 
(relative to a simple donation request) primarily because it signals an anchor or a reference 
price to which potential donors can compare candidate contributions.  We test this hypothesis 
against the currently popular view that the exchange of a token provides an alibi for the 
donation, against a powerful social norm promoting the pursuit of self interest (Miller & 
Ratner, 1998; Miller, 1999).    
 
2. Exchange as an alibi 
Holmes et al. (2002) argue that a powerful societal norm of self-interest precludes 
people to behave altruistically.  In fact, even individuals who experience strong feelings of 
compassion may be hesitant to act on those feelings because of this norm.  People think that 
most other people are mainly driven by self-interest (Miller & Ratner, 1998).   They prefer 
self-interested behavior, to avoid being exploited by self-interested others, or to avoid social 
disapproval for being ‘irrational’ (Miller & Ratner, 1998; Miller, 1999).  Even in a 
completely anonymous setting people might still want to obey the norm of self-interest 
because they have internalized the belief that it is the appropriate and rational thing to do 
(Tyler, Huo, & Lind, 1999).    
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Framing the donation as a commercial exchange may therefore provide potential 
donors a ‘psychological cover’, which enables them to act altruistically (i.e. an excuse for not 
complying with the norm of self-interest). It gives them the opportunity to show their genuine 
compassion, while avoiding the negative feelings associated with violating the norm of self-
interest.  
Construing a donation as a transaction has the additional advantage that it can limit 
the implications for the self of what Lerner (1986) calls ‘justice motive’. By responding to 
appeals for unconditional help, one creates a moral and psychological duty to be helpful to all 
other persons or groups worthy of help in the future: “If I help now, I’ll always have to help!” 
Engaging in a commercial transaction does not generate the same moral commitment.  
 
3. Exchange as an anchor 
Prior research in marketing, however, suggests an alternative explanation for why 
consumers prefer combinations of donations and token products over mere donation requests.  
When confronted with a donation request, the potential donor needs not only to decide 
whether to give, but also how much to give.  Just like consumers may have difficulties in 
estimating the price of a service due to a lack of the cost of good sold (Bolton, Warlop, & 
Alba, 2003; Xia, Monroe, & Cox, 2005), we assume that in a mere donation setting potential 
donors experience difficulties determining what would be an appropriate donation amount.  
For economic reasons they may want to avoid too large a contribution, while too small a 
contribution may be perceived as inappropriate.  Decision difficulty often leads to choice 
deferral (Dhar, 1996). And similarly, potential donors may make no contribution at all if 
determining the appropriate donation appears too difficult.   
The option to buy something instead of just donating, may therefore increase the 
incidence of donations because the reference price of the token product introduces an implied 
reference donation. Comparable to the finding that first offers serve as anchors and strongly 
predict final settlement prices in a negotiation situation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), we 
suggest that, when exchange is added to donation, the value of the product in exchange may 
serve as an anchor that is used to determine the expected donation amount and thus may 
influence the decision to donate.  
Such an ‘anchor’-interpretation of exchange in donation settings is consistent with 
earlier findings of Fraser, Hite, and Sauer (1988). They stated that potential contributors 
probably form an impression of some minimally socially acceptable anchor point to which  
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potential contribution amounts are compared.  Amounts greater than the minimum anchor are 
regarded as generous, and amounts smaller than the minimum are regarded as socially 
unacceptable. In that sense, an overpriced exchange may signal a donation price that is equal 
to or even higher than the perceived donation price in mere donation settings. Asking a lot of 
money in exchange of a worthless token might be perceived as unfair. In addition, because 
helping someone in need should not lower one’s outcomes below a deserved level (Miller 
1999), compliance with donation requests coupled with overpriced exchanges may not help 
or even decrease compliance rates compared to mere donation settings.  
In contrast, a low priced exchange product may signal a donation price that is lower 
than the perceived donation price in mere donation settings. Moreover, low priced exchanges 
may legitimize small contributions and, therefore, render most excuses for noncompliance 
(e.g. “We can’t afford to help.”) inappropriate and make refusal socially embarrassing. This 
assumption is supported by Cialdini and Schroeder’s (1976) finding that, in a door-to-door 
charity drive, a reminder to potential donors that ‘even a penny will help’, significantly 
increased the number of donations without affecting their average size. They argued that 
people are more likely to donate in this case because of self-presentation concerns (see also 
Brockner, Guzzi, Kane, Levine, & Shaplen, 1984; Reeves, Macolini, & Martin, 1987; 
Reingen, 1978).  
This ‘self-presentation’ explanation might also account for the findings of Holmes et 
al. (2002) who obtained an increase of donations in the exchange condition, but only when 
the beneficiary’s need was said to be high (as opposed to low or moderate). Although Holmes 
et al. contended that the offer of an economic exchange might increase donations by creating 
‘psychological cover’; it may equally be due to a ‘psychological coercion’. More specifically, 
the offer of helping charity for a minimal amount in exchange of a token may increase 
donations because it renders it difficult for people to refuse help and still see themselves as 
just and decent (i.e. comply with the social norm of need or social responsibility; e.g. 
Berkowitz, 1972; Darley & Latane, 1970).  
Finally, if the presence of an anchor or reference price is an important factor in 
triggering donations, the association of mere donations and fixed prices should cause similar 
effects. That is, compliance rates in a mere donation setting should also be elevated when 
giving potential donors the opportunity to donate a specified small amount. Requesting 
specific large donation amounts, on the other hand, should decrease the probability of 
compliance. In that context, Schwarzwald, Bizman and Raz (1983) already showed that in  
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combination with the foot-in-the-door paradigm donation sizes can be elevated by requesting 
specified amounts. Still, the foot-in-the-door technique is a gradual persuasion technique in 
which an initial, modest request is followed by a subsequent, larger request.  In our research, 
however, we want to test whether compliance rates can be enlarged by requesting specified 
amounts, without the aid of a proceeding modest request.   
 
4. Empirical research 
The main goal of this research was to test an anchoring mechanism for the role of 
adding exchange to charity. We expected more people to donate in exchange of a product 
compared to a mere donation condition. However, we expected this effect of exchange to be 
moderated by its price. Indeed, rather than providing the subjects with a psychological cover 
as the exchange fiction hypothesis suggests, a low token price may urge people to donate as it 
provides them with a comfortable indication of the expected amount; that is the signal of a 
‘fair’ price. On the other hand, an overpriced token or too high an anchor may not help or 
may even inhibit people from donating. Further, if an exchange can ‘help or hurt’ depending 
on its price, we hypothesize that specifying contribution amounts in the context of mere 
donations should bring about compliance rates that are comparable to those in exchange 
settings.  
 
5. Study 1 
In the first study, we explored the effect of an exchange on the incidence and amount 
of donations. We thereby controlled for the frivolous or functional nature of the token 
exchange, because in the context of bundling charity donations to the purchase of a product 
(e.g. for every package of its coffee sold during the Christmas Holidays, Douwe Egberts® 
recently donated one serving of coffee to the homeless), Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) found 
that charity incentives were more effective in promoting frivolous products than practical 
products. They suggested that donations complement or neutralize the negative feelings 
associated with indulging in frivolous consumer behavior (see also Kivetz & Simonson, 
2002). By means of a pre-test we obtained two products that differ significantly in frivolity, 
but score equally on a functionality-scale: regular and colored staples.  
To explore our prediction that an exchange might signal an anchor or reference price 
that may induce people to donate, we asked participants to estimate the value of the offered 
products either before or after the donation decision.  If people are more likely to donate  
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when their attention is first drawn to the product value, this would yield further support for 
our assumption that the value of the product in the exchange serves as an anchor that guides 
people in their donation decision.  
 
5.1. Method 
5.1.1. Participants. A total of 144 volunteer undergraduate economics students participated 
in this scenario study which was part of a written questionnaire, conducted in groups of about 
20 people.  
5.1.2. Materials and procedure. The participants were randomly assigned to one of three 
experimental conditions. They were asked to donate to a charity without a product being 
offered (mere donation), donate in exchange of the ‘functional’ staples (practical exchange), 
or donate in exchange of the ‘frivolous’ staples (frivolous exchange). The charity used in the 
scenario was described as follows: “An organization that delivers basic medicine for the 
treatment of diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, and sleeping disease in parts of Africa, Asia, & 
Latin-America”.  In the exchange conditions, a picture of the staples accompanied the appeal. 
Participants had to indicate whether or not they would be willing to donate and how much.   
In the exchange conditions, we also asked participants to estimate the shop value of 
the product either before or after the donation request. As the shop value of a product may 
somehow differ from the value participants think its worth to them on that moment in time, 
we added a third exchange condition in which we asked participants before the donation 
request how much they would pay for the product if they would have the chance to buy it 
‘here and now, under these circumstances’. The donation request and the value estimation 
were always presented on different sheets of paper. 
In all, then, our design consisted of 1 mere donation condition and 6 exchange 
conditions. The latter represented a 2 (type of product: functional vs. frivolous) by 3 
(combination of questions: (1) donation request before shop value, (2) shop value before 
donation request, and (3) ‘here&now-value’ before donation request) design.   
 
5.2. Results 
The frivolous versus functional nature of the token did not significantly affect our 
results. We therefore collapse over this factor in our analysis. This leaves three different 
conditions in which participants where offered an exchange: donation request before shop 
value (Exchange 1), shop value before donation request (Exchange 2), and ‘here&now-value’  
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before donation request (Exchange 3). Together with the mere donation condition 
(Donation), this leads to four different experimental conditions (see Table 1 for the different 
cells). 
5.2.1. Compliance probability. A logistic regression with donation (yes versus no) as the 
criterion, and experimental condition as the predictor, revealed a main effect, LR χ²(3) = 
14.81, p = .002 (see Table 1). In line with our hypothesis, planned contrasts revealed that the 
compliance rate was significantly higher in the conditions where participants had to estimate 
the value first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3) than in the conditions where participants had to 
decide whether or not to donate first (Donation & Exchange 1), LR χ²(1) = 12.65, p = .0004. 
Moreover, the compliance rate was not significantly higher in the exchange condition in 
which the donation question was asked first (Exchange 1) than in the mere donation 
condition (Donation), LR χ²(1) < 1, ns. The compliance rate was significantly higher in the 
exchange conditions in which a value question was asked first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3) 
than in the exchange condition in which the donation question was asked first (Exchange 1), 
LR χ²(1) = 5.58, p = .02. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In an additional analysis of the exchange conditions we also included the value that 
participants estimated. This analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction between the 
estimated value and the position in which the value questions were asked, LR χ²(1) = 3.27; p 
= .071: When participants had to estimate the value first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3), the 
donation intention decreased as the estimated value increased; when participants received the 
donation question first (Exchange 1), the estimated value had no effect on the compliance 
rate.  
5.2.2. Contribution revenues. Since within-condition donations were not normally 
distributed, a logarithmic transformation (X + 1) was applied. On the data of the participants 
who made contributions (N = 89; two outliers were excluded from analysis using ± 3 SD), we 
conducted an ANOVA with amount as the dependent variable and experimental condition (4 
levels) as the independent variable. A main effect of experimental condition was obtained, 
F(3, 85) = 7.70, p = .0001. Subjects in the mere donation condition donated significantly 
more, F(1, 85) = 22.42, p < .0001, than those in the exchange conditions.   
In an additional analysis of the exchange conditions (N = 67), we again included the  
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estimated value (i.e. shop value or ‘here & now’ value dependent on the condition; 
logarithmic transformed) as a covariate. This ANCOVA revealed a significant positive effect 
of the estimated value on the contribution size, F(1, 63) = 31.50, p < .0001: The higher 
participants estimated the product value, the more they contributed if they donated. 
 
5.3. Discussion 
Overall, participants were more likely to donate when offered an exchange than when 
no exchange was presented. Intriguingly, within the exchange conditions, participants 
appeared more likely to donate when they first had to estimate the value of the exchange than 
when they first had to indicate whether they would donate or not. In addition, in the exchange 
conditions where participants had to estimate the value first, the likelihood of donation 
decreased as the estimated value went up. In the exchange condition where participants first 
had to decide whether or not to donate, the estimated value was not related to the outcome of 
the donation decision. 
Possibly, in a donation situation, people try to construct some minimally socially 
acceptable anchor point against which candidate contribution amounts are compared. As the 
magnitude of that lower anchor increases, the magnitude of the contribution will increase, but 
the probability of compliance will decrease (cf. Fraser et al. 1988). Indeed, the higher our 
participants estimated the value, the less likely they were to comply with the donation 
request, but the more money they were planning to donate if they did decide to donate. 
Asking participants to estimate the value of the product before they decided to donate 
may have cued a ‘donation anchor’. The product value (shop value c.q. the value participants 
think it is worth to them on that very moment), probably functioned as a reference price and 
gave people an indication of the expected donation amount. In addition, as the product was 
rather inexpensive, the donation anchor was for most participants sufficiently low to persuade 
them to donate. In the mere donation condition, participants may not only have had more 
difficulty to construct a donation anchor, they also may have constructed a more elevated 
donation anchor. Two pieces of evidence support this assumption. First, the variance of the 
donation amount (logarithmic transformed) was much higher in the mere donation condition 
(SD = .34) than in the exchange conditions (SD = .22): F(1, 87) = 7.21, p = .009 (Levene’s 
Test for Equality of Variances). Second, for the donating participants, donation amount was 
significantly higher in the mere donation condition than in the exchange conditions. In fact, 
the median amount donated in the mere donation condition was rather elevated (Md = €10).  
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Many participants in the mere donation condition presumably overestimated the ‘cost’ of 
donating, and hence decided not to donate. This is consistent with the assumption that 
participants in the mere donation condition lack an anchor that informs them on an acceptable 
donation amount. In the exchange condition, such an anchor is provided by the shop value or 
‘here&now’ value (whichever is measured) of the product that is offered in exchange for the 
donation.  
One potential alternative explanation for the findings in Study 1 deserves mention. 
The fact that people donate more easily when they first have to estimate the product value, 
may be similar to a foot-in-the-door effect. The foot-in-the-door paradigm suggests that 
compliance breeds compliance. Having agreed to an initial request, individuals infer that they 
are helpful and cooperative. When then confronted with a second and larger request, people 
are more likely to comply so as to maintain a consistent self-image. In our experiment, the 
value estimation question might have functioned as the first modest request, which was then 
followed by the second and larger donation request. Although we doubt the validity of this 
alternative explanation because answering a value question is hardly comparable to a 
compliance request, we try to rule it out by collecting additional data in Study 2.  
 
6. Study 2 
Study 2 provides a more critical test of our hypothesis that people donate more easily 
when their attention is drawn to a low product value. In addition, we also test whether an 
exchange can be ‘overpriced’ and consequently, can inhibit people from donating compared 
to a mere donation baseline condition. Finally, in the current study, participants have to make 
a real donation decision, rather than a decision in a scenario. That is, if they decide to donate, 
they actually have to give some money. 
As the type of product did not matter in Study 1, we use only colored paperclips in the 
exchange condition. To test our hypothesis, we manipulate the value of the paperclips (€3 vs. 
€0.50). We hypothesize that the €0.50 paperclips will signal a ‘fair’ donation price, a socially 
acceptable anchor which will persuade people to donate. The €3 paperclips, conversely, can 
represent too large an anchor that does not induce but rather inhibits people to donate 
compared to the mere donation context.  
 
6.1. Method 
6.1.1. Participants. Participants were 184 undergraduates (from several majors), who were  
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paid €7 for their participation in a number of unrelated experiments, ending with the current 
study.  
6.1.2. Material and procedure. Participants were invited to the lab in groups of at most eight 
people. In a brief introduction they were told that they would participate in a series of 
unrelated experiments. At the end of the session when participants had been paid €7, 
registered and thanked for their participation, they received an envelope with the invitation to 
donate. They were asked to have a look at it in their cubicle before leaving the room.  The 
letter explained that the Marketing Department organized its annual donation drive, and that 
all marketing students and experimental participants were given the chance to make a 
donation as well. The money would go to ‘an organization that delivers basic medicine for 
Africa, Asia, & Latin-America’, as in Study 1.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: They 
were invited (1) to just donate (mere donation condition), (2) to donate in exchange of 
paperclips without a shop value mentioned (no value exchange condition), (3) to donate in 
exchange of paperclips with a mentioned shop value of €3 (€3-exchange condition), (4) or to 
donate in exchange of paperclips with a mentioned shop value of €0.50 (€0.50-exchange 
condition). This shop value was mentioned between brackets after the description of the 
offered product. In the exchange conditions, the product (colored paperclips) was included in 
the envelope. Participants were told that they could take the product home when donating 
some money; any amount was said to be appreciated. To make any donation between €0.50 
and 7 € possible, the €7-endowment was paid in coins of €0.50, €1, and €2. Finally, all 
participants were asked to close the envelope and leave it in the big donation box at the 
entrance of the laboratory. This donation box was used to increase the feeling of anonymity. 
Donations were actually contributed to Doctors Without Borders.  
 
6.2. Results 
6.2.1. Compliance probability. A logistic regression with donation (yes versus no) as the 
criterion, and experimental condition as the predictor, confirmed our hypotheses. There was a 
main effect of experimental condition, LR χ²(3) = 12.23, p = .007 (see Table 2). The 
compliance rate was significantly higher in the €0.50-exchange condition than in the mere 
donation condition, LR χ²(1) = 5.63, p < .02. In contrast, the compliance rate was slightly 
lower in the €3-exchange condition than in the mere donation condition, although the 
difference did not reach significance, LR χ²(1) < 2, ns. In summary, we found evidence for  
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the moderating role of the price of an exchange in triggering potential donors. Price does 
matter; the compliance rate was significantly higher in the €0.50-exchange condition than in 
the €3-exchange condition, LR χ²(1) = 11.05, p = .0009.  
Although the compliance rate was slightly more elevated in the no-value exchange 
condition than in the mere donation condition, this difference was not significant, LR χ²(1) < 
2, ns. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
6.2.2. Contribution revenues. We conducted an ANOVA on the data of the donating 
participants (N = 102) with donation amount as dependent variable and experimental 
condition (4 levels) as independent variable. Since donations were again not normally 
distributed, a logarithmic transformation (X + 1) was applied. The amount donated was 
affected by the experimental condition, F(3, 98) = 6.7, p < .0001. Not surprisingly, the 
participants in the €3-condition donated on average more than those in the other conditions. 
The other conditions did not significantly differ.  
 
6.3. Discussion 
In this study, the ‘exchange’ effect appears to be dominated by the price of the token. 
In line with Study 1, the €0.50-token signaled a comfortable reference price, leading to an 
elevated compliance rate. However, as the price of the token increased to €3, the compliance 
rate plummeted. For larger donation requests to be effective, they have to be perceived as 
lying within a plausible range for donation (Doob & McLaughlin, 1989).Whereas €3 is often 
used as a real donation price by NGO’s, many students in this context (they had just worked 
an hour to receive €7) may not have perceived the €3 as lying within a plausible range of 
acceptance.  
In the no-value exchange condition, the compliance rate was lower than in the €0.50-
exchange condition, but still higher than in the €3-exchange condition. Possibly, in this 
condition, the presence of the token itself might have signaled an implicit reference amount, 
that is not as ‘low’ as €0.50 or as ‘high’ as €3.00 (M2 = €1.93). As in Study 1, we notice a 
slight (but not significant) increase in compliance rate in the no-value exchange condition 
(i.e. Exchange 1 condition in Study 1) compared to the mere donation condition in which 
they received no indication at all.   
Finally, when looking at the results of Study 2, the alternative food-in-the-door  
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explanation of Study 1 seems to be no longer valid. In Study 2, there was no initial value 
estimation that could have functioned as a first modest request. In that sense, the estimated 
value in Study 1 has the same anchoring function as the mentioned shop value in Study 2: 
Whether participants first have to estimate the product value (Study 1) or whether the value is 
already mentioned, people donate more easily when they are presented with a low product 
value, as opposed to an exchange setting in which no price indication is present.  
 
7. Study 3 
In Study 1, some participants in the exchange conditions were asked to estimate the 
value of the product before deciding to donate. This apparently gave them a comfortable 
reference price, a rather low ‘donation anchor’. In the mere donation condition, on the other 
hand, participants lacked a donation anchor; they had problems in estimating a ‘fair’ price, 
and even constructed a more elevated donation anchor. As a result, the compliance rate was 
higher in the exchange conditions than in the mere donation condition. In Study 2, however, 
we found that the compliance rate in exchange conditions critically depends on the price of 
the token. If the token price is sufficiently low, compliance with a donation request increases 
relative to a mere donation situation. If the token price is rather high, compliance with a 
donation request decreases relative to a mere donation situation.  
To the extent that the offer of a token exchange merely signals an expected donation 
amount, one might wonder whether influencing compliance rates requires an exchange at all. 
In fact, providing people with an explicit low reference price in a mere donation setting might 
be enough to cause comparable results to the low priced token exchange in Study 1 and 2. By 
the same reasoning, similarly low compliance rates as in high-priced exchange conditions 
may be obtained when donation requests are accompanied by an explicit high reference price. 
These issues are addressed in our third study.  
 
7.1. Method 
7.1.1. Participants and design. A total of 196 undergraduates participated in this between-
participants computerized questionnaire study. The questionnaire was part of one hour 
session of unrelated experiments in the lab. Participants were paid €6 for completing the 
entire questionnaire packet.  
7.1.2. Procedure. We told participants we were investigating their donation behavior. The 
general instruction read as follows: ‘To be able to adjust the annual donation drive of the  
 
13
Marketing Department, we want some feedback concerning your donation preferences. You 
will be presented with ten different hypothetical situations. Please try to indicate for each 
situation whether you would donate or not.’ All scenarios explained that the Marketing 
Department each year organized a donation drive and that all marketing students and 
experimental participants were given the chance to make a donation as well; after an 
experimental session participants were supposedly approached to make a donation.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five experimental scenarios. In the 
mere donation scenarios, they were asked to indicate whether or not they would donate and if 
so, how much. In the low and high priced donation condition they were asked whether or not 
they would donate €0.50 or €3. In the low and high priced token condition they were asked 
whether or not they would donate in exchange of a € 0.50 or €3 token, respectively. As 
mentioned earlier, all scenarios were repeated ten times, using ten different charities in all 
conditions and ten different products in the exchange conditions. The pairing of charities and 
products was randomized for each participant in the exchange conditions separately.   
 
7.2. Results 
7.2.1. Compliance probability. We conducted a logistic regression with the proportion of 
‘yes’-responses as the criterion, and experimental condition as the predictor. A significant 
main effect of experimental condition was obtained, LR χ²(4) = 107.72, p < .0001 (see Table 
3). As expected, people in the low priced conditions (donation & exchange) were more likely 
to comply than people in the high priced conditions, LR χ²(1) = 67.96, p < .0001, and than 
people in the mere donation baseline condition, LR χ²(1) = 65.83, p < .0001, respectively. As 
in Study 2, however, the frequency of compliance in the high priced conditions did not 
significantly differ from the mere donation baseline condition, LR χ²(1) < 2, ns.  
Unexpectedly, the proportion of participants agreeing to offer money was greater in 
the priced donation conditions (low & high) than in the priced exchange conditions (low & 
high), LR χ²(1) = 14.71, p = .0001. Moreover, the compliance rate was significantly higher in 
the high priced donation condition than in the mere donation condition, LR χ²(1) = 7.59, p = 
.0059. The compliance rate did not significantly differ between the high priced exchange 
condition and the mere donation condition, LR χ²(1) < 1, ns. Finally, the difference between 
exchange and priced donations was comparable for a high (3.00 €) and low price (0.50€), LR 
χ²(1) < 1, ns. 




7.2.2. Contribution revenues. In the current study, only in the mere donation condition, 
participants could decide on the amount they were willing to donate. As in Study 1, the large 
variance (SD = 11) of the donation amount in the mere donation condition is consistent with 
our assumption that potential donors, in the absence of an anchor (i.e. an exchange), 
experience problems in determining a socially acceptable donation amount. Participants 
presumably overestimate the ‘cost’ of donating (Md = €5.00) and hence decide not to donate 
at all. The other four conditions exhibit fixed prices and participants could not alter this 
amount. Contrary to the first two studies, participants received no instruction that any amount 
would be appreciated. In that sense, analyzing the contribution revenues in the current study 
yields no additional insight. 
 
7.3. Discussion 
The data support our hypothesis that bundling mere donations with fixed prices would 
generate similar results as bundling donation requests with priced tokens. The presence of a 
small or large reference price in a mere donation setting can apparently fulfill the same 
‘anchoring’ function as an exchange. Moreover, our data show that ‘priced’ donations are 
met with an even higher compliance than the corresponding exchange conditions. Most 
counter-intuitive is the fact that the high priced donation request yields significantly greater 
probability of compliance than the mere donation condition. As for the high priced exchange 
request, we notice a small but insignificant drop in compliance compared to the mere 
donation setting. We assume therefore that not the high price in itself seems to be responsible 
for the low compliance rate in the high priced exchange condition, but a high price in 
exchange of a near-worthless token. Rather than pure economic reasons, feelings of 
exploitation may be part of the excuse for not donating in exchange of high priced tokens: 
‘The postcard presumably is less expensive in the supermarket’. Bundles of mere donations 
and fixed prices possibly entail a smaller risk that potential donators feel exploited.  
 
8. General discussion 
In three studies, we find support for an anchoring mechanism for the role of adding 
exchange to charity. People react positively to bundles of a donation request and the offer of 
a near-worthless token because tokens signal a low anchor amount, a ‘fair’ price. Our results 
do not decisively rule out the exchange fiction explanation of Holmes et al. (2002). In fact,  
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our first two studies are still in line with their theory of the norm of self-interest. 
Nevertheless, we think that our anchoring explanation goes beyond the exchange fiction and 
allows a broader understanding of donation decisions than Holmes et al.’s account. Indeed, 
Study 3 shows that the anchoring exchange product can just as well be replaced by requesting 
a specified donation amount; this finding cannot be accommodated in Holmes et al.’s 
exchange fiction theory as no exchange is present. 
In a mere donation setting, people lack a reference price. In their attempt to estimate a 
socially acceptable donation amount, they overestimate the cost of giving and thus decide not 
to donate. The offer of a token, on the contrary, signals a reference price or an anchor to 
which other donation amounts may be compared (Fraser et al., 1988). A ‘low’ socially 
acceptable anchor will urge people to donate as it signals a ‘fair’ price and leaves people 
feeling ‘trapped’ in a good deal. A ‘high’ socially unacceptable or too large an anchor, on the 
contrary, may inhibit people from donating. Feinberg (1986), however, found more people 
donating a larger amount when a credit card (i.e. a ‘spending’ cue) was present. Feinberg’s 
finding may be explained by the fact that a credit card signals a large but unspecified amount, 
that is, a vague indication of an expected contribution that could not be perceived as lying 
‘outside’ the plausible range of acceptance. 
Like an exchange can ‘help or hurt’ depending on its price, a combined use of mere 
donations and specified contribution amounts can similarly influence compliance rates. 
Moreover, priced donations work even better than the offer of an exchange. We put forward 
that the transparency of the donation deal may play an important role here. In a mere 
donation setting, people know that their money in its entirety would be given to the described 
charity whereas in the exchange setting the actual cost of the product remains somewhat 
ambiguous. We think this transparency might be the reason why in the studies of Holmes et 
al. (2002) the exchange conditions (when target need was ‘high’) triggered more compliance 
than the priced donation conditions. In their experiments, the product cost and the net 
donation value were explicitly mentioned in the request (e.g. “This candle costs $2 in the 
shop, we sell it for $3, so $1 will go to charity.”).  
Finally, we conclude that the price of a small token has to be well considered. If the 
token is perceived as being ‘overpriced’, people may be inhibited from donating, possibly 
due to feelings of exploitation. A participant’s post experimental reaction demonstrates this: 
“How odd it may seem, I would rather just donate €3 than to buy a useless postcard!” This is 
consistent with the observation that offering a product in exchange of a donation may trigger  
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self-serving motivations and ‘economic’ thoughts about the usefulness of the product, 
whereas merely asking for a donation could trigger more social equity concerns (Van Dijk, 
2003).  In that sense, bundles of mere donations and fixed prices are the safest option. 
Moreover, in terms of total revenue they generate higher revenues: first of all due to the 
higher compliance rates, and secondly because there is no product cost to subtract.  
 
9. Caveats and future research 
The first limitation of our research is that two of our three studies were scenario 
studies and did not measure real behavior. Nevertheless, the compliance rate (our main 
dependent variable) is quite comparable across the three experiments. On the other hand, the 
mean amount donated in the mere donation condition was substantially higher in our scenario 
studies (Studies 1 & 3), than in our study that entailed real behavior (Study 2). This is 
consistent with the notion that people do not always have a perfect insight in how they would 
behave in certain situations (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).  
A second limitation is that our participants were all college students. It is important to 
assess the validity of our findings across other populations. Integrating the findings of 
Brockner et al. (1984), Cialdini and Schroeder (1976), and Fraser et al. (1988), we note that 
the size of the anchor points may change over time due to inflation and are probably 
population dependent (e.g. students vs. business men). Accordingly, we suggest the €3-token 
condition might result in different compliance rates in another population and/or several 
years from now.  
Third, it is possible that the application of charity related tokens, which the donator 
can use to ‘signal’ his social reliability (e.g. an HIV ribbon or an Amnesty candle), would 
generate different results. In this case reputation concerns might be involved in the donation 
decision (Milinski, Semmann & Krambeck, 2002).   
An interesting avenue for future research is to test whether priced donation requests, 
compared to mere donation requests, can also improve response rates in a direct mail context. 
For example, although legitimizing small contributions significantly increased the number of 
donations in a door-to-door charity drive (Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976), this technique failed 
to boost compliance rates in a direct mail fund-raising (DeJong & Oopik, 1992). There is 
evidence that donations in a direct mail campaign can be strongly influenced by choosing 
appropriate quantities in the request (Desmet & Feinberg, 2002), but so far these appeal 
scales have not been tested against a mere donation setting.  
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In this research, the charities we used were rather major and well-known in the 
country. It would be interesting to investigate whether Sinha and Batra’s finding (1999) that 
consumers are more price conscious when they perceive price unfairness by national brands 
(which results in private label purchases), also holds for charities. If consumers are also more 
price conscious when they perceive price unfairness by national charities, well-known 
national charities would have to pay extra attention when determining their token prices. 
Moreover, local charities (e.g. local basket ball team) then may even have a competitor’s 
advantage of using ‘higher’ prices before being perceived as ‘unfair’.   
Finally, in our studies, participants’ donation decisions were influenced by an 
informative anchor and participants were probed to consider the anchor as a possible 
donation value. Future research should also explore whether similar results can be obtained 
by means of ‘basic anchoring’. Basic anchoring is the situation in which people’s judgements 
of a target are influenced by a numerical anchor that is completely uninformative (e.g. a 
number generated by a wheel of fortune) and where people are not asked to consider the 
anchor as a possible target value (cf. Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996). Suppose, for 
example, that students before answering the donation request had just written down the price 
of a beer, which happens to be €1.50. Would this unrelated and uninformative small 
numerical anchor induce them to donate?  
 
10. Epilogue 
Each day people perform acts of altruism. To economists this phenomenon is difficult 
to explain: If people are all selfish utility maximizers, why should they make sacrifices for 
others? Several explanations have been proposed to address this question. These include the 
desire to experience a ‘warm glow’ (e.g. Isen & Levin, 1972), a need to view oneself as good 
and kind (Walster, Berschield & Walster, 1973), an aspiration to ‘do the right thing’ (Dawes 
& Thaler, 1988), a quest for moral satisfaction (Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992), or a signal of 
social reliability to gain indirect reciprocity or political reputation (Milinski et al., 2002). 
What these explanations all have in common is the underlying assumption that helping other 
people gives you something in return. This suggest that one way of thinking about charitable 
giving is to view potential donors as consumers seeking some return utility from donating 
money. However, because they are already buying something ‘immaterial’ (e.g. a warm 
glow), perhaps we do not need to offer them an additional material good (e.g. a candle). 
Crucial in the marketing of donations is to make the transaction as smooth as possible. We  
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should offer them an indication of a comfortable expected donation amount. In other words, 
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Table 1  Donation Rate and Median Amount Donated as a Function of Experimental 
Condition  
 
  Mere Donation  Exchange 
    1  2  3 
First question  Donation
a 
(n = 48) 
Donation 
(n = 32 ) 
Shop Value 
(n = 35) 
‘Here & Now’ 
(n = 29) 
Donation rate  46%  56%  80%  80% 
Non zero median amount   € 10.00  € 2.75  € 4.00  € 3.50 
Note. 





Table 2  Donation Rate and Mean Amount Donated as a Function of Experimental Condition 




(n1 = 52) 
No Value 
(n2 = 46) 
€3 
(n3 = 44) 
€0.5 
(n4 = 42) 
Donation rate  50%  61%  39%  74% 




Table 3  Proportion of ‘Yes’-Responses as a Function of Experimental Condition 
Mere Donation  Priced Donation  Priced Exchange 
Baseline 
(n = 41) 
Low (€0.50) 
(n = 37) 
High (€3.00) 
(n = 40) 
Low (€0.50) 
(n = 38) 
High (€3.00) 
(n = 40) 
47% 75%  57%  67%  45% 
 
 